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ScienceDirectRespiratory tract infections can be caused by a wide variety of
viruses. Airborne transmission via droplets and aerosols
enables some of these viruses to spread efficiently among
humans, causing outbreaks that are difficult to control. Many
outbreaks have been investigated retrospectively to study the
possible routes of inter-human virus transmission. The results
of these studies are often inconclusive and at the same time
data from controlled experiments is sparse. Therefore,
fundamental knowledge on transmission routes that could be
used to improve intervention strategies is still missing. We here
present an overview of the available data from experimental
and observational studies on the transmission routes of
respiratory viruses between humans, identify knowledge gaps,
and discuss how the available knowledge is currently
implemented in isolation guidelines in health care settings.
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Introduction
Viral respiratory tract infections are a leading cause of
morbidity and mortality worldwide, representing an enor-
mous economic and disease burden [1]. Respiratory
viruses replicate in the respiratory tract from where they
are subsequently shed and transmitted via respiratory
secretions. They are classified in different virus families
and differ in virulence and target groups. Respiratory tract
infections may range from asymptomatic to acute live
threating disease thereby posing a major health threat to
young children, elderly, and immunocompromisedCurrent Opinion in Virology 2018, 28:142–151 people. Respiratory viruses spread via three different
transmission routes: contact (direct or indirect), droplet
and aerosol transmission (Table 1) [2,3]. Contact trans-
mission refers to direct virus transfer from an infected
person to a susceptible individual (e.g. via contaminated
hands) or indirect virus transfer via intermediate objects
(fomites). Transmission of virus through the air can occur
via droplets or aerosols. The commonly accepted cut-off
size between the large droplets and small aerosols is
5 mm, although this varies considerably between studies,
ranging up to 12 mm [4–8]. Droplets generated during
coughing, sneezing or talking do not remain suspended in
air and travel less than 1 m before settling on the mucosa
of close contacts or environmental surfaces. Aerosols have
a slow settling velocity, thus they remain suspended in
the air longer and can travel further [5,9,10].
Transmission via each of these three routes is complex
and depends on many variables such as environmental
factors (e.g. humidity and temperature), crowding of
people, but also on host factors such as receptor distribu-
tion throughout the respiratory tract. The fact that all
these variables affect the different transmission routes of
the different respiratory viruses in a dissimilar way, makes
it very difficult to investigate them experimentally [9,11].
Here, we summarize the evidence from experimental and
observational studies on inter-human transmission routes
of important respiratory viruses (summarized in Table 2).
A literature search was conducted for each respiratory
virus using ‘human transmission experiments’ and
‘transmission (routes)’ of the virus of interest as search
criteria in PubMed and Google Scholar. Subsequently,
the backward snowball method was applied in which
additional papers were identified based on the reference
list of a paper of interest. As this review focuses on the
evidence on inter-human transmission routes, data from
animal studies were excluded. In addition, intervention
studies, (aircraft) outbreak reports and household studies
were excluded if the transmission route was not specifi-
cally investigated. The strengths and weaknesses of the
different methods employed in transmission studies are
summarized in Table 3. Finally, we discuss our findings in
the light of several available (inter)national guidelines on
infection control. Our observations underscore the urgent
need for new knowledge on respiratory virus transmission
routes and the implementation of this knowledge in
infection control guidelines to advance intervention strat-
egies for currently circulating and newly emerging viruses
and to improve public health.www.sciencedirect.com
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Table 1
Commonly accepted respiratory routes of transmission
Transmission route Particles involved and particle characteristics Characteristics/definition of transmission
Contact Self-inoculation of mucous membranes by contaminated hands.
Direct Deposited on persons. Virus transfer from one infected person to another.
Indirect Deposited on objects. Virus transfer through contaminated intermediate objects (fomites).
Airborne
Droplet Droplets (>5 mm).
Remain only shortly in air (<17 min) [116].
Dispersed over short distances (<1 m).
Short range transmission.
Direct inoculation of naı¨ve person through coughing/sneezing/
breathing of infected person.
Deposition mainly on mucous membranes and upper respiratory
tract.
Aerosol Aerosols, droplet nuclei (<5 mm),
Remain in air for an almost infinite amount of time.
Dispersed over long distances (>1 m).
Long range transmission.
Inhalation of aerosols in respirable size range.
Deposition along the respiratory tract, including the lower airways.
Table 2
Overview of the evidence on transmission routes of respiratory viruses based on experimental data and the transmission route according
to infection prevention guidelines
Virus Virus familya Transmission route
Experimental and observational data Guidelinesb
Measles virus Paramyxoviridae Aerosol [75–77,78,79]. Contact [3,110], droplet [3,109–111],
aerosol [3,109–111].
Parainfluenza virus Paramyxoviridae Limited data, contact (by fomite) [83,84] e. Contact [3,109–111], droplet [3,109–111],
aerosol [3,109].
HMPV Pneumoviridae Limited data, contact (by fomite)e [30] Contact [3,110,111], droplet [3,110,111].
RSV Pneumoviridae Contact [89,88], droplet [88], aerosol
[90,91].
Contact [3,109–111], droplet [3,109,110],
aerosol [109,111].
HCoV Coronaviridae Limited data, contact (by fomite) [65–67] e. Contact [3,110,111], droplet [3,110,111].
MERS-CoV Coronaviridae Contact [84] e [89] c [91], droplet [89] c,
aerosol [91].
Contact [111], droplet [3,111]
SARS-CoV Coronaviridae Contact [70] e [73,79,101], droplet
[73,78,79,117], aerosol [76,118] c [82] c,d.
Contact [3,110,111], droplet [3,110,111],
aerosol [3,110,111].
Rhinovirus Picornaviridae Contact [35,36,42], aerosol [37,40,119]. Contact [109–111], droplet [109,111],
aerosol [109–111].
Adenovirus Adenoviridae Contact [100] e [100,101], droplet [103],
aerosol [102,103].
Contact [3,109–111], droplet [3,109,110],
aerosol [110,111].
Influenza virus Orthomyxoviridae Droplet/aerosol [55,56,57,59] Contact [109–111], droplet [3,109–111],
aerosol [3,109–111].
a Taxonomy was based on [62], airborne transmission is seemingly linked to:
b WIP [108], ‘Blue Book’ [109], ‘Red Book’ [110], CDC [3] and Up-To-Date [111]. The conclusions on experimental data as presented in this table
reflect the conclusions from the authors.
c Superspreader events.
d Aerosol-generating procedures (in a nosocomial situation).
e Conclusions were drawn based on stability experiments.Measles virus (MV)
Measles is one of the most contagious viral diseases in
humans that has been associated with aerosol transmis-
sion for a long time [12,13,14,15–17,18]. However, it
should be noted that MV also replicates systemically, and
that there is a role for dead cell debris-associated virus
spread via fomites. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, data
from retrospective observational studies obtained during
outbreaks in pediatric practices, a school, and a sporting
event suggested transmission through aerosols [14,15–
17,18]. Indeed, those studies showed that most second-
ary cases never came in direct contact with the indexwww.sciencedirect.com patient and some were never even simultaneously pres-
ent in the same area as the index case [14,18]. Exami-
nation of airflow in the pediatricians’ offices showed that
aerosols were not only dispersed over the entire exami-
nation room but also accumulated in the hallway and
other areas [14,18]. Furthermore, based on the inves-
tigation of air circulation in a sport stadium, in which a MV
outbreak occurred, authors suggested that MV had been
dispersed through the ventilation system [16]. Thus it
was concluded that MV can be transmitted via aerosols.
Although coughing is a common symptom associated with
measles disease, index patients were described to coughCurrent Opinion in Virology 2018, 28:142–151
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Table 3
Overview of the methods to study human-to-human transmission and their respective pro’s and con’s
Study design Pro Con Reference
Virus stability  Can provide indirect evidence for
transmission route.
 Easy to perform.
 Not conclusive as transmission itself is not
investigated.
[42,43,65,70]
Outbreak (household or
hospital) reports
 Study natural infections.
 Includes the most susceptible
patients who are difficult to include
in experimental studies.
 Retrospective.
 Usually not conclusive on transmission route or
relative importance of transmission routes.
[120–123]
Outbreak report —
aircraft
 Relatively easy to perform
 Outbreak in closed setting
 Retrospective which can result in recall-bias and
hard to trace back passenger movements.
 Inconclusive.
 Only reported in case of secondary infections and
in these cases infections may also occur before or
after the flight.
[118,124–127]
Non-pharmaceutical
Intervention
 Can help to discriminate between
transmission routes if performed
properly.
 Usually no controlled environment.
 Difficult to determine ideal time-point of the
intervention.
 Risk of drop-out or perseverance.
[35,128–131]
Pharmaceutical
intervention
 Can help to identify relative
importance of transmission routes
 Controlled environment
 Difficult to include enough patients to obtain
statistically significant results
[132]
Experimental infection  Controlled environment.
 Donor selection and control.
 Real-time data collection.
 Repeatable.
 Various parameters can be studied
at the same time.
 Possibility to study different
inoculation routes.
 Ethical obstacles.
 Infectivity and disease can differ from that in a
natural infection (attenuated strains).
 Difficult to create ideal and comparable
circumstances.
 Many factors have to be taken into account:
duration, influence of superspreaders, sampling
methods.
 Difficult to get naı¨ve or risk group participants
who are interesting to study.
[42,44,102]
Miniature field trial  Can discriminate between contact
and airborne transmission.
 Ethical obstacles.
 Exposure time may not be sufficient.
 Difficult to create ideal and comparable
circumstances.
[38,39,40]
Air sampling  Noninvasive for patients.
 Quantification of viable virus in the
air.
 Characterization of droplet/
aerosol size.
 Can be used in parallel with human
studies or outbreaks.
 Can gain information on possible
aerosol spread.
 In a nosocomial setting aerosol-generating
procedures can play a major role.
 Frequently only detection by PCR.
 Direct human-to-human transmission is not
studied (circumstantial).
 Technical issues (procedure may affect virus
viability) or false interpretation.
[34,37,57,91,103,133]
Air tracer studies  Monitoring airflow pattern can
indicate possible airborne
transmission (if not done
retrospectively).
 Visualize airstream
 Usually performed retrospectively and not during
outbreaks
[134,135]
Computational
Modeling/Simulation
 Describes transmission in a
greater context.
 Can account for heterogeneity of
transmission within a population.
 Human mannequins can be used
as replacement for humans
 Theoretical (for mathematical modeling).
 Artificial setting.
[82,136–141]frequently and vigorously in the outbreak reports of
pediatric practices. Remington et al. calculated the infec-
tious dose of MV produced by the index case through
coughing, using a mathematical model based on airborne
transmission. They found that the index case produced a
very high infectious dose compared to cases from otherCurrent Opinion in Virology 2018, 28:142–151 outbreaks and mentioned a phenomenon called super-
spreading [18]. Superspreaders are individuals who are
able to infect a disproportionally large number of suscep-
tible contacts when compared to a typical individual [19–
22], which may contribute to the efficient transmission of
MV.www.sciencedirect.com
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metapneumovirus (HMPV)
There is a substantial lack of (experimental) evidence on
the transmission routes of PIV (types 1–4) and HMPV.
For both viruses, contact and droplet transmission are
commonly accepted transmission routes [23–25]. How-
ever, only virus stability on various surfaces has been
investigated so far and it has been shown that PIV and
HMPV are stable on non-absorptive surfaces and can
barely be recovered from absorptive surfaces [26–30].
Respiratory syncytial virus (RSV)
Transmission of RSV among humans is thought to occur
via droplets and fomites [1,7]. In the 1980s three potential
transmission routes of RSV were studied in humans by
dividing infected infants and healthy volunteers into
three groups, representing: Firstly, all transmission
routes, secondly, transmission via fomites and finally,
airborne transmission by allowing the volunteers to have
either, firstly, direct contact with infants (cuddlers), sec-
ondly, touching potential fomites (touchers) or finally,
sitting next to the infant (sitters). Volunteers in the group
of the cuddlers and touchers but not the sitters became
infected, suggesting that direct contact and droplet trans-
mission were the probable routes for efficient infection of
the volunteers and that transmission via aerosols was less
likely [31]. Another study on the transmission via fomites
showed that RSV could be recovered from countertops for
several hours, but only for several minutes from absorp-
tive surfaces such as paper tissue and skin [32]. Later on,
in the late 1990s, Aintablian et al. detected RSV RNA in
the air up to 7 m away from a patient’s head [33]. In spite
of that, since virus infectivity could not be demonstrated,
potential airborne transmission of RSV has been consid-
ered negligible and transmission of RSV was thought to
occur mainly through contact and droplet transmission.
However, in a recent study authors were able to collect
aerosols that contained viable virus from the air around
RSV infected children [34]. Although the detection of
viable virus in the air is by itself not enough to confirm
aerosol transmission, the general presumption that RSV
exclusively transmits via droplets should be reconsidered
and explored further.
Rhinovirus
Extensive human rhinovirus transmission experiments
have not led to a widely-accepted view on the transmis-
sion route [35–37,38,39,40]. Inhalation of aerosols
(0.2–3 mm) resulted in efficient rhinovirus infection
[41], but little to no infectious rhinovirus could be dem-
onstrated in sneezes and coughs as detected by virus
titration [42]. Rhinovirus can survive on stainless steel,
plastic and skin for a couple of hours [42,43]. Additionally,
virus was detected in saliva, occasionally on hands and
could be recovered from the skin of recipients after
rubbing either a contaminated fomite or hand [42,44].
When rubbing of fomites was followed by auto-www.sciencedirect.com inoculation this resulted in infection of the volunteers
[35]. In a three-day rhinovirus experiment with healthy
volunteers different exposure modes were used to inves-
tigate the rhinovirus transmission route: Firsrtly, small-
particle exposure (separating donor and recipients by wire
mesh), secondly, large particle exposure (encouraging
contact, coughing and sneezing while wearing gloves)
and finally, direct contact exposure (hand contact fol-
lowed by self-inoculation). From the results it was con-
cluded that direct contact was the main transmission
route [36]. Furthermore, rhinovirus RNA was detected
in offices by air sampling studies and subsequent
sequencing resulted in a matched air-mucus pair [37].
In a miniature field trail, experimentally infected donors
with severe colds participated in a card game with sus-
ceptible recipients for 12 hours [38,39,40]. A
restraining device, preventing touching of the head and
face, was used in the aerosol condition and heavily
contaminated cards and exaggerated hand-to-face move-
ments in the fomite condition. In these experiments
aerosol transmission was suggested [40].
In general, transmission rates and exposure time varied
between studies, which may contribute to the different
routes of transmission that were observed. Therefore, the
donor-hours of exposure was determined using donors
with severe rhinovirus infections. At 200 hours of expo-
sure to donors, transmission had occurred to 50% of the
susceptible recipients, though the transmission route
itself was not investigated [38].
Influenza A virus
Due to the severity of the yearly influenza epidemics and
the potential of zoonotic influenza A viruses to cause
severe outbreaks, there have been many studies on influ-
enza A virus transmission among humans. Different kinds
of studies, such as air sampling and intervention studies,
as well as human challenge studies have been conducted.
In addition, transmission events have been described
extensively after outbreaks in aircrafts, households and
hospital settings. However, until today, results on the
relative importance of droplet and aerosol transmission of
influenza viruses stay inconclusive and hence, there are
many reviews intensively discussing this issue [10,45–50].
Already in the mid-1900s human challenge models were
used to assess the transmission route of influenza virus
[51,52–54]. It was shown that illness outcome is depen-
dent on the inoculation route and tends to be milder in
intranasally infected volunteers in comparison to inocu-
lation through inhalation [52,53]. Furthermore, illness
seemed to be milder in experimentally infected volun-
teers than in naturally infected individuals [51]. Increas-
ing numbers of studies focused on the detection and
quantification of influenza viruses contained in droplets
and aerosols expelled into the air through breathing,
sneezing and coughing of infected individualsCurrent Opinion in Virology 2018, 28:142–151
146 Emerging viruses: intraspecies transmission[9,55–56,57,58–61]. Influenza virus RNA was detected in
the air up to 3.7 m away from patients with the majority of
viral RNA contained in aerosols (<5 mm) [59]. The pres-
ence of virus in aerosols could indicate potential airborne
transmission, although many studies only quantified the
amount of viral RNA [55,57,61]. A few studies quantified
viable virus, although this was only recovered from a
minority of samples [9,58,59].
Coronavirus
In humans, alpha (229E and NL63) and beta corona-
viruses (OC43, HKU1, SARS and MERS) are associated
with respiratory disease [62,63]. Alpha coronaviruses have
a high attack rate early in life and spread rapidly during
outbreaks, indicating efficient human to human transmis-
sion [63]. Furthermore, samples obtained from staff and
patients of a neonatal and pediatric intensive care unit
showed a high incidence of human coronaviruses HCoV-
229E and HCoV-OC43, suggesting staff-to-patient and
patient-to-staff transmission [64]. Unfortunately, there is
very little data to corroborate on the HCoV-229E, HCoV-
NL63 and HCoV-OC43 transmission routes. HCoV-
OC43, HCoV-229E and HCoV-NL63 infectivity was lost
between 0 and 72 hours on non-absorptive surfaces,
although it can survive several days in medium or PBS
[65–67]. Aerosolized HCoV-229E had a half-life of
67 hours in a rotating steel drum (at 20 C and 50%
relative humidity) [68]. SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV
appeared to have an unusual capacity to survive on dry
surfaces as compared to HCoV-229E, HCoV-OC43, and
HCoV-NL63 [69,70].
The SARS outbreak was primarily linked to healthcare
settings, with 49% of the cases linked to hospitals [71],
most probably caused by aerosol-generating procedures
on severely ill patients [72,73]. Aerosol-generating pro-
cedures like intubation, the use of continuous positive-
pressure ventilation and drug delivery via nebulizers are
likely to produce ‘fine infectious droplets’, which travel
further than droplets from coughs [74]. Additionally,
superspreading events contributed to the dispersion of
the SARS outbreak [73,75–77], particularly in the Hotel
Metropole and the Prince of Wales Hospital in Hong
Kong [76]. Moreover, a link with transmission to health-
care workers was observed when they were in close
proximity (<1 m) to an index patient, suggesting direct
contact or droplet transmission [73,78,79]. Air samples
and swabs from frequently touched surfaces in a room
occupied by a SARS patient tested positive by PCR,
although no virus could be cultured from these samples
[80]. In the Amoy gardens outbreak fecal droplet trans-
mission was suggested [81,82].
To date, there is little data on the human-to-human
MERS-CoV transmission route [83]. MERS-CoV
remained stable on non-absorptive for 8 up to 48 hours
and for 10 min at 20 C and 40% relative humidity inCurrent Opinion in Virology 2018, 28:142–151 aerosols [84]. MERS-CoV outbreaks in humans are, like
those with SARS-CoV, primarily linked to healthcare
settings, with a link to hospitals in 31% of the cases
[71,85,86] and healthcare associated human-to-human
transmission was observed [87,88]. Superspreader events
were shown to play an important role in nosocomial
outbreaks [71,89]. Virus was isolated from environmental
samples in hospital rooms, suggesting direct contact or
fomite transmission. Moreover, the airborne potential of
MERS was investigated by air sample analysis [90,91].
Viral RNA was detected on the inlet of air ventilation
equipment [90] and virus was isolated from air samples
and surfaces from inaccessible areas like the ventilator
exit, implicating potential aerosol transmission [91].
Adenovirus
Human adenoviruses can cause respiratory disease
(mainly type 1–5, 7, 14 and 21) [92,93], conjunctivitis
or infantile gastroenteritis (type 40 and 41) [94]. They are
a common cause of respiratory illness and pneumonia in
children [95,96], whereas infections are generally asymp-
tomatic in adults [92]. Adenoviruses cause nosocomial
outbreaks, especially in pediatric care facilities, where
they spread rapidly [95,97,98]. Moreover, adenovirus type
4 and 7 are responsible for large outbreaks of acute
respiratory disease, especially in crowded conditions.
This is illustrated by, for example, outbreaks among
military recruits for which airborne spread was suggested
[92,94,99]. It is difficult to eliminate adenovirus from
skin, fomites and environmental surfaces [100]. An out-
break in a mental care facility was probably enhanced by
spending the day mainly in a crowded room while sharing
cigarettes and soda cans, suggesting indirect fomite
spread [101]. In a study published in 1966, experimental
infections with adenovirus administered as aerosols (0.3–
2.5 mm) or droplets (15 mm) to healthy, male inmates,
resulted in infection of all volunteers, although the result-
ing illness resembled a natural infection only in the
aerosol group [102]. During a military training period,
increased numbers of adenovirus infections occurred over
time, which correlated with an increased detection of
PCR-positive air filters. Additionally, a correlation
between disease and the extent of ventilation was
observed, with more ventilation resulting in fewer disease
cases [103]. In a more recent study in military recruits,
positive viral DNA samples were mainly obtained from
pillows, lockers and rifles, although adenovirus DNA was
also detected in air samples. No consistent correlation
between increased positive environmental samples and
disease was observed [104].
Discussion
Studies on the transmission routes of respiratory viruses
have been performed since the beginning of the 20th
century [105]. Despite this, the relative importance of
transmission routes of respiratory viruses is still unclear,
depending on the heterogeneity of many factors like thewww.sciencedirect.com
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and host [5,19]. Differences in virus shedding between
individuals can contribute to the transmissibility rate,
especially in the case of superspreaders [75,106]. In
addition, the SARS-CoV outbreak highlighted the impact
of aerosol-generating procedures on the increased risk of
human-to-human transmission [74,107], demonstrating
that for these procedures additional containment mea-
sures are necessary.
Inter-human transmission has been studied under many
different (experimental) conditions. A summary of the
advantages and disadvantages of the different study
designs (Table 3) highlights the difficulty of human
transmission experiments. As a consequence, contrasting
results have been obtained for many viruses. This is also
reflected in Table 2, summarizing the experimental data
on inter-human transmission. Besides the difficulty of
performing studies under well-controlled conditions,
another key issue is that often (attenuated) laboratory
strains are studied in healthy adults, which does notFig. 1
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hence influence the outcome of the studies.
Respiratory viruses are an important cause of nosocomial
infections, especially in children. Therefore, we con-
sulted the guidelines on infection prevention from
National [108], European [109], American [3,110] and
International [111]) organizations for their information on
transmission routes (Table 2) and associated isolation
guidelines (Figure 1). Unfortunately, terms and defini-
tions of respiratory transmission routes and isolation
guidelines are not always used in a uniform way, leaving
room for personal interpretation. But more importantly,
information on the transmission route does not always
reflect the isolation guidelines (e.g. for PIV and rhinovi-
rus, Figure 1). As a proxy for transmission route, virus
stability is often referred to in the guidelines, however,
this can only imply a role for indirect contact transmission
but is by no means conclusive on the transmission route.
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148 Emerging viruses: intraspecies transmissionprecautions such as strict hand hygiene and cough eti-
quette. It is important to note differences in isolation
guidelines between different organizations and the lack
of correlation to scientific data. The variation in described
transmission routes and associated isolation guidelines
among the different organizations underscores the lack of
convincing data.
Well-designed human infection studies could be
employed to investigate the role of transmission routes
of respiratory viruses among humans [112]. However,
since human transmission experiments are very challeng-
ing, animal transmission models can provide an attractive
alternative and should be explored and developed for all
respiratory viruses. In such experiments, the influence of
environmental factors on transmission routes can also be
investigated [113]. However, before extrapolating exper-
imentally generated data to humans, it is important to
understand the limitations of these models, and appreci-
ate the heterogeneity of experimental setups employed in
laboratories [114]. Furthermore, quantitative data such as
viral load in the air can be obtained by air sampling
methods in various environments, such as hospital set-
tings. Air sampling of viruses is an increasingly used
technology in animal and human experiments. However,
whereas most studies rely on the detection of viral
genome copies, viability assays such as plaque assays or
virus titration should be included to gain information on
virus infectivity.
Ultimately, the knowledge gap on inter-human transmis-
sion should be filled by developing and performing state-
of-the art experiments in a natural setting. Combined
with animal transmission models and air sampling in
different (health care and experimental) settings, these
data should result in a thorough scientific understanding
of the inter-human transmission routes of respiratory
viruses. Eventually, this knowledge will help with an
evidence-based risk assessment of the different transmis-
sion routes to improve existing infection prevention
strategies.
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